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IT’S NOT JUST SPORT: TAIWAN AND 
THE 2008 BEIJING OLYMPIC TORCH RELAY
Ping-Chao Lee




This paper employs an approach drawn from the strategic relations approach in an empirical evaluation 
of the behavior of the participators in the governance of the political sporting system within/beyond the 
‘Chinese Community’. The paper highlights the significance of political intentions as a key characteristic of 
the strategic environment which provides the two governments’ interests space to pursue ‘political actions’, 
and evaluates the responses of the participators in the governance system. Three major conclusions are as 
follows: first, this case illustrates how local Chinese-Taiwanese sports political nexus being implicated within 
a global sports system, as a strategic context, which provides a source of influence and power, constrains and/
or facilitates the choices available to the participators; second, it points to evidence that the political intentions 
of modern states are more likely to pursue their projects by engaging in a complex network of competition 
or collaboration and the torch relay issue is thus characterized by a diversity of interests, preferences, values 
and ideas, which individuals or groups seek to promote or protect in such a context; finally, the case portrays 
how the outcome of one set of struggles (Olympic torch relay issue) sets the strategic context for subsequent 
governance decisions.
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Introduction
The conventional view of Taiwan’s place in the 
global political system has, since the 1950s, oscil-
lated precariously from that of a favored ally of the 
United States as a bulwark against the expansion of 
Communist China, to a position of marginalization 
as the United States sought to woo the Communist 
authorities from the beginning of the 1980s (Chu 
& Lin, 2001). International sport, in particular the 
relative positions of Taiwan and Communist China 
within the Olympic movement (Bairner & Hwang, 
2011), gained symbolic importance as the issue of 
the ‘Two Chinas’ manifested itself in the sports do-
main, with both sides seeking to claim legitimacy in 
representing the ‘interests of China’ during the Na-
tionalists (KMT) ruling period. With the Democrat-
ic Progressive Party (DPP) gaining power in 2000, 
Taiwan underwent another significant change in 
politics, which also had a profound impact on sport 
development since the ‘new’ government recog-
nized sport as an important part of national policy, 
and as a useful tool to establish Taiwanese identity 
(Lin, Lee, & Cheng, 2010). Sport thus became an 
important facet of claims to nationhood and nation-
al pride on the part of the Taiwanese (‘One China, 
One Taiwan’), intensified by the troubled relation-
ship with China. Looking at Taiwan’s political de-
velopment in recent decades, types of manifesta-
tion at the level of international policy flow from the 
clash of ideology in relation to the issue of Greater 
China/Two Chinas. Problems within the Olympic 
movement, problems and conflicts between Taiwan 
and China in international sports events are identi-
fied (Liu, 2007). Indeed, “Taiwan’s Olympic role, 
always nettlesome for China, is more problematic 
at a PRC-hosted Games” (DeLisle, 2008, p. 33). 
Lind has also pointed out that “the most heated 
competition in the Olympics could take place not 
in a stadium but in the Taiwan Strait (Lind, 2006, 
p. 38). The episode underscores the deep mistrust 
between Beijing and Taipei, antagonists in an un-
resolved civil war, and how entwined in politics the 
Olympic Games became (New York Times, 2007).
The following specific example serves to illus-
trate the nature and diversity of the subtle relations 
between the IOC, China, and Taiwan in this politi-
cal sporting structure. Just how complicated and 
suspense-filled the relations between Beijing and 
Taipei are was seen in the dispute over the route 
of the Olympic torch. The torch relay has become 
an expression of universalism in the context of the 
host nation, with an emphasis on using the route to 
encapsulate the peaceful dimensions of the world’s 
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multiple cultural, ethnic, political identities. The 
delicate political situation involving the 2008 Ol-
ympic torch arises from the decades-old difference 
in standpoints between China and Taiwan regard-
ing the state sovereignty claims (Bairner & Hwang, 
2011). Because a torch relay [route] including Tai-
wan may imply that “Taiwan is part of China, which 
Beijing so insists and Taipei so resists, it raises a se-
rious doubt that this may happen at all” (Xu, 2006, 
p. 104). Like all host countries, China attempted to 
use the Olympic Games to promote its own agendas. 
The torch relay was intended to symbolize national 
unity when it announced that the international relay 
would advance from Vietnam to Taiwan and on to 
Hong Kong (Brownell, 2009). In response to Chi-
na’s intention, Taiwanese authorities refused Bei-
jing’s proposal because the move that “the Chinese 
were seeking to create was that this would be part 
of the domestic leg of the torch’s journey rather 
than being clearly international” (Bairner & Mol-
nar, 2010, p. 7) which could amount to an admis-
sion that the nation is part of China. Consequently, 
Taiwan became “the first IOC member to decline to 
be included in the route” (Yu & Mangan, 2008, p. 
838). Tensions in relation to the torch relay route had 
significant implications for diplomatic/sport policy, 
while also/again providing China and Taiwan with a 
‘competence’ in the field of the Olympic movement.
Within this context, this paper seeks to focus 
on the strategic relations, roles and interactions 
between various participators in the international 
political sporting system in shaping policy out-
comes during, and following, the period of the 
2008 Olympic Torch relay dispute. The research 
is framed within a theoretical strategic-relational 
model, which offers an approach to the explanation 
of national activity based on an understanding of the 
structural contexts within which policy is generated, 
and of the (intentional) actions and (intended 
and unintended) consequences of the actions of 
individuals and groups of participators (Hay, 2002). 
It focuses on the network of relations in which 
state (or supranational) activity is conducted and 
as such it lends itself to the analysis of the complex 
policy networks which operate at a fairly abstract 
and generalized level. What the strategic relations 
approach emphasizes is that any analysis of the 
state form, including all forms of forces that might 
act within, beyond, and around the state, should be 
taken into account. The interaction between agents 
and the state-specific structures is always dynamic 
and dialectical (Jessop, 2008). The state structural 
factors focus on the context within which political 
events, outcomes, and effects develop, which are 
beyond the control of the participators. They are 
involved directly in the context (structure) and their 
behavior, conduct, and agency are responsible for 
effects and outcomes from different actions, which 
one can observe and explain, within/beyond/around 
this state structure (Henry, 2001). As the state has 
only a set of institutional capacities, the state’s power 
could be seen in relation to the forces acting in and 
through these institutions. “Power and policy are 
executed through various, contingent mechanisms 
that form part of the dialectic of structure and 
strategy” (Kelly, 1999, p. 112). The participators 
(forces) within/beyond/around the state, act in an 
historical context which is dynamic (contingent) 
(Liu, 2003).
In the sports arena, a strategic relations analy-
sis offers a way to identify and characterize the sa-
lient relationships, interactions and strategies that 
characterize the management of a set of sporting or-
ganizations. It informs “the significance of specific 
historical settings in which state-society relations 
evolve and asserts the idea that previous contests 
form the conditions for recent/current struggles” 
(Girginov, 2009, p. 517). The fact that the historical 
context provides resources in specific situations, in 
which some groups are allowed to pursue their own 
strategic goals (Henry, 2001). The participators are 
conceptualized as “reflexive and strategic, orient-
ing themselves and their strategies towards the en-
vironment within which their strategic intentions 
must be realized” (Hay, 2002, p. 210). Arguably, 
policy outcomes are contingent, and, the analysis 
of policy outcomes in political, economic, and so-
cial contexts during specific periods would be ap-
propriately explained by the accounts of the struc-
tures within which state actions occur, the devel-
opment and reproduction of such structures by the 
consequences of the agents involved, and the pow-
er struggles, which take place between the various 
forces (groups and individuals) within those struc-
tures (Jessop, 2008).
In essence, the strategic relations approach ar-
gues that one should focus at a more concrete level 
on the nature of ‘strategic action’, and of the ‘strate-
gically selective context’ within which such an ac-
tion is formulated, with each impacting on the other 
(McAnulla, 2002). It highlights access to, and the 
use of, resources within the strategic environment 
to achieve preferred ends for particular participa-
tors (Liu, 2003, 2005). My goal within this context 
is to identify the participators’ perceptions/expla-
nations of their own and others strategic actions, 
of the nature of the strategically selective context, 
and of the strategies facilitated by such contexts. 
Both the structures and their strategic selectivity 
are considered as significant as well as the role of 
various agents within and around sport (Liu, 2005). 
Guided by the strategic relations theory, this paper 
undertakes an analysis of the Olympic movement in 
China, Taiwan and the IOC, focusing on a specific 
set of debates around the scheme of proposing the 
2008 Olympic torch relay route, which emerged in 
2007, and evaluates how the system was managed 
in political and managerial terms in this context.
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Methods
The aim of this paper was to identify the range 
of interests and participators involved in the discus-
sion of a competition/negotiation for sport, elabo-
rating the complexities of the policy networks in-
volved. In order to investigate the nature of the stra-
tegic context and the explanations/motivations/ac-
tions of strategic participators, an analysis of this 
study is based on three main sources: interviews, 
government documents, and media commentaries. 
Fourteen interviews were conducted with key indi-
viduals, including three officials of the government 
institutions from the Sports Affairs Council and the 
Mainland Affairs Council, two non-governmental 
sports administrators of the Chinese Taipei Olym-
pic Committee, two members of Taiwan’s Parlia-
ment (one KMT, one DPP), one coach, one athlete, 
and experts in sports politics (three academics and 
two journalists) over the period from December 
2008 to April 2009. A review of the literature and 
material from the interviews has brought to light 
a set of divergent motives among the participators. 
Nevertheless, there is a principal limitation on the 
selection of interviewees because this study was 
based on a Taiwanese perspective evident from the 
data, since both persons from the Chinese and the 
IOC constituencies were difficult to access.
As “documents do not simply reflect the facts, but 
also construct social reality and versions of events” 
(May, 1997, p. 164), and explanations forwarded for 
the forging of these associations are yet to be verified 
with primary evidence, motivations are suggested 
on the grounds of secondary, documented evidence. 
Secondary data were in the form of analysis of 
published and unpublished documentary materials 
produced by the government institutions (Mainland 
Affairs Council, Sports Affairs Council in Taiwan) 
involved, non-governmental sports administration 
(International Olympic Committee, China Olympic 
Committee, Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee, 
Beijing Organizing Committee for the Games 
of the XXIX Olympiad), together with media 
commentaries regarding sports policy. In this 
study, the author reviewed 66 Government reports 
and 367 media articles. The period of analysis ran 
from the time when the 2008 Olympic Games was 
awarded to Beijing in June 2001 until September 
2008 (the Beijing Games terminated). Interviews 
were transcribed and translated by the author. 
Meanwhile, interview transcripts, government 
reports/proceedings of parliamentary debates, 
and media commentaries were subject to coding 
employing the Nvivo 8 qualitative data analysis 
software package, and coding and analysis were 
undertaken employing an ethnographic content 
analysis approach. This approach employs a protocol 
which allows the application of both pre-determined 
deductive, research ‘imposed’ categories, and 
inductively determined, categories or codes arising 
from respondents’ (or report authors’) comments.
Results
“The Olympic Games are by definition politi-
cal” (Lenskyj, 2010, p. 15). “Throughout modern 
history the Olympics have been mired in power 
politics, international tension, the 2008 Olympics is 
not the first to highlight the rivalry between Taiwan 
and China” (Lind, 2006, p. 40). In 2001, the former 
IOC president, Juan Samaranch sent a letter of con-
gratulation dated 23 March to President Chen Shui-
bian, expressing the hope that Taiwan would con-
tinue to support the Olympic movement. To some 
extent, the new government responded in a positive 
manner and decided to support China’s bidding for 
the 2008 Summer Olympic Games (Liu, 2005). And 
such a ‘moderate’ political atmosphere surrounding 
the inaugural DPP regime reflected well on sport-
ing affairs if Beijing would host the Games. In the 
build-up to the Beijing Olympic bid, the two sides 
considered the possibility of Taiwan’s involvement 
in co-hosting the 2008 Games and the inclusion of 
the Olympic torch relay route. However, the idea 
of co-hosting soon evaporated since China insisted 
that this could only be done on the premise of the 
‘one China’ principle (Bairner & Hwang, 2011), in 
accordance with the IOC regulation that only allows 
the same Olympic Games to be hosted in the same 
country (International Olympic Committee, 2007).
Ever since Beijing won the bid in July in 2001, 
the government immediately assigned a National 
Security Commission in September, with a 
membership composed of the President’s Office, 
the Executive Yuan, Sports Affairs Council, 
Mainland Affairs Council, Chinese Taipei Olympic 
Committee, etc., to deal with the related affairs 
of the Olympic torch relay route passing through 
Taiwan (Interview A, 20 March 2009). At that 
time, the government viewed the possibility of the 
torch relay in Taiwan with ‘a cautious welcome’ 
and emphasized the importance of equality, mutual 
benefit and national dignity (Interview C, 3 February 
2009). For instance, in a written statement, the 
Cabinet spokesman of the pro-independence DPP 
government expressed ‘sincere congratulations’, 
while also encouraging the mainland to carry out 
the Olympic spirit in cross-Strait relations, and to 
abandon the use of force in cross-Strait disputes 
(Lianhe Zaobao, 2001, quoted in Xu, 2006, p. 104). 
China’s proposal to let the Olympic torch pass 
through Taiwan ignited a heated debate from the 
propensity of domestic politics to push both Beijing 
and Taipei to harden their positions. Nevertheless, 
the ongoing contention between the political entities 
over Taiwan’s mainland policy explicates how the 
parameters of Taiwan’s internal policy debate 
toward the Olympic torch had temporarily ceased 
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because Beijing’s schedule was only ‘initially pro-
posed’ but not ‘officially fixed’. In effect, the final 
decision would be jointly made by the IOC together 
with the host country and the final draft of the 
Olympic torch relay route had to be submitted to 
the IOC for approval at the end of that year [2005] 
as the BOCOG president Liu Qi indicated (Tsai, 
2007). As a result, both sides remained caught in a 
contradiction which was reshaped by their domestic 
and international political priorities/realities and 
evolving strategic circumstances.
In November 2006, the BOCOG sent out invi-
tations to the Olympic committees, which includ-
ed the Taiwan/Chinese Taipei Olympic Commit-
tee/CTOC, under whose jurisdiction the proposed 
Olympic torch route would fall. On December 28, 
2006, the president of the CTOC, Tsai, replied ac-
cepting the invitation and later signed a memoir 
which outlined the four points of consensus1 relat-
ed to the Olympic torch relay with the BOCOG on 
February 12, 2007. On March 2007, according to 
the BOCOG, the CTOC agreed with the previously 
mentioned points in a signed and confirmed letter, 
in which the CTOC president said:
 On behalf of the Chinese Taipei Olympic Com-
mittee, I would like to confirm the reaching of 
consensus between the BOCOG and us in our 
meeting, as well as to confirm the 2008 Beijing 
Olympic Games torch relay route concerning 
the Taipei leg. I believe that with further plan-
ning and consultation between the two parties, 
the torch relay will be conducted successfully in 
Taipei and it will leave a perfect record. (China 
Daily, 2007)
Having agreed the 2008 Beijing Olympic 
Games torch relay route concerning the Taipei leg 
by BOCOG and CTOC, the IOC also approved the 
planned route for the Beijing Olympic torch relay 
in the middle of April. While the ‘concurrence’ was 
‘reached’, in contrast to the CTOC’s behavior, its 
government rejected the deal. As Mr. Tsai indicated:
 The current evolution of many issues is out of 
our sports community’s control. Taiwan’s sta-
tus as an independent sovereign state would 
be degraded if the Olympic flame travels to 
Hong Kong via Taipei, so my authorities re-
quest that the relay enter into Taipei and exit 
Taipei through third-party countries. Though 
the CTOC is a non-governmental organization, 
it should respect and follow the government’s 
decision. (Ma & Lan, 2007)
Concurrently, apart from the authorities in Bei-
jing criticizing the Taiwan government’s unilat-
eral abrogation of a bilateral agreement reached 
by both sides, the BOCOG appealed to the public 
by showing documents signed by CTOC president 
Tsai, pledging Taiwan’s participation, which im-
plied that the CTOC had agreed to the route (Yu, 
2008). However, Tsai responded and pointed out 
that “I can only say there is a different opinion [in 
Taiwan] between sport officials and government of-
ficials” (Yu & Mangan, 2008, p. 838). The illustra-
tion implied that the CTOC was unlikely to have its 
own choice but to act as the government intended 
to achieve (Interview B, 17 March 2009).
On April 26 2007, the 2008 BOCOG of the 
XXIX Olympiad officially announced the sched-
ule of the Beijing Olympic Games torch relay, which 
began its journey in Greece and covered more than 
137,000 kilometers by visiting 20 international cit-
ies on five continents and all through China. The 
route proposed by BOCOG had the torch entering 
Taiwan via Vietnam from Ho Chi Minh city, and 
going on to Hong Kong, which is a special admin-
istrative region of China, making Taipei the last 
on the international leg and the first on the domes-
tic leg of the relay (Lind, 2006). The outcome of 
the final torch relay route was none other than the 
proposal, in March 2005, that the “Beijing author-
ities concerned with the Taiwan issue is intrinsic 
to national self-respect and regime survival” (Chu, 
2004, p. 491). Tensions emerged over Beijing’s pro-
posed inclusion of Taiwan in the torch relay route 
when Taiwan’s government recognized that BO-
COG’s proposal dwarfed Taiwan’s status, a marked 
dwarfing of its sovereignty. As the SAC minister 
indicates that:
 Political machinations aimed at downgrading 
our status in the IOC are evident in China’s pro-
motional activities for the 2008 Beijing Olym-
pics (…). This route is a ‘domestic’ route decid-
ed in March 2005 by Beijing Organizing Com-
mittee President Liu Qi, without regard to the 
proposal of the CTOC that the torch enter Tai-
1 The four points are:
1) Both parties are committed to abiding by the regulations, resolutions and practice of the IOC and together preserving the 
purity and sanctity of the Olympic torch relay and Olympic flame.
2) The Beijing Olympic Games torch relay is an important part of the Beijing Olympic Games. Just like the Games, the relay 
must follow the Olympic Charter.
3) The Beijing Olympic Games torch relay passing Taipei is a sport and cultural activity carried out within the jurisdiction of 
the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee. The Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee will ensure that the torch relay is conducted 
smoothly under its jurisdiction.
4) When the torch relay is conducted under the jurisdiction of the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee, the use of relevant flags, 
emblems and songs should strictly follow the relevant regulations of the IOC. (China Daily, 2007)
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wan from a third country and depart to a fourth 
country. China will most certainly publicize the 
transfer of the torch from Taiwan to Hong Kong 
as being from ‘Taipei China’ to ‘Hong Kong 
China’ and ‘Macau China’ and then onward 
to other cities in China. This is an attempt by 
China to engineer the relay route so that Chi-
nese Taipei is included in China’s domestic re-
lay route. (Sports Affairs Council, 2007)
Having understood Taiwan’s decision, the Be-
ijing organizers advocated Taiwan’s authorities 
could follow an agreement reached by the mem-
oir of the meeting for the four-point consensus on 
the relay route and discard political consideration 
to obey the IOC’s Olympic Charter, relevant rules 
and regulations, to make Taiwan’s citizens’ wishes 
for participating in the Olympic torch relay avail-
able. Internationally, the IOC which “has ‘supreme 
authority’ over the Games” (Lenskyj, 2010, p. 21), 
played an important role in this debate as a source 
of external authority Taiwan’s rejection of the torch 
relay schedule indeed invited the IOC’s concern as 
its president Jacques Rogge illustrated:
 I think we have only to judge for the route (…). 
Many things will happen in this field. Nothing 
is final (…). The Chinese organizers proposed 
to the Chinese Taipei National Olympic Com-
mittee to have the flame, they had accepted that 
in February [2007]. They have changed their 
minds now, but who says that that is final? So 
I wouldn’t make comments at this stage. (Ma-
laysia Sun, 2007)
However, the above claim reflected no signal 
that the IOC had made a final decision. While the 
continuing emergence of issues associated with the 
torch relay may derail, the Olympic Games’ spirit 
for Beijing was raised, the IOC issued its ‘princi-
ples’ for dealing with this case:
 We are hopeful that a satisfactory agreement 
will be reached. This matter is best resolved by 
BOCOG and the National Olympic Committee 
of Chinese Taipei. It is at this point a Games 
Organizing Committee matters. (International 
Olympic Committee, 2007, p. 4)
Thus the IOC sent letters to the CTOC and the 
BOCOG on July 18, urging that both sides across 
the Taiwan Strait would conduct a new round of 
negotiations on the torch relay and reach an agree-
ment by August 15, 2007. The deadline for the ne-
gotiation was further extended to the end of August 
under IOC’s approval. On August 29, the Taiwan 
authorities claimed that both CTOC and BOCOG 
had reached a new three-point consensus2 which 
had no relation to the former ‘four-point consensus’ 
of February 12, 2007 (Mainland Affairs Council, 
2007). As for the previous ‘four-point consensus’, 
Taiwan’s government tended to ignore it because the 
CTOC’s signing had not been authorized/agreed by 
the Government, as is clarified by this comment by 
the former SAC Minister:
 I was wondering who authorized the CTOC 
to negotiate with the BOCOG about the torch 
relay route? (...). The CTOC needed govern-
ment’s approval before negotiation, didn’t it? 
The torch issue was not simply a non-govern-
mental affair (…). When China’s airplane car-
rying the Olympic torch applied to land at Tai-
wan’s airport, could CTOC decide this? It in-
volves work with government Ministries such as 
the Interior, Mainland Affairs, Foreign Affairs, 
Transportation (…). So, the CTOC can’t rep-
resent Taiwan’s position without government’s 
authorization. (Interview A, 20 March 2009)
While Taiwan’s political leaders denied the pre-
vious ‘agreement’ and proposed the new routing, 
BOCOG asserted that the “CTOC has broken four 
agreements reached by the two sides on the torch 
relay route, not to mention the principle of separat-
ing sports from politics as enshrined in the Olympic 
charter” (International Olympic Committee, 2007, 
p. 43). And it put out:
 The proposed route of the Beijing Olympic torch 
relay has been authorized by the IOC’s final 
decision. It is unlikely for the hosting unit to 
change the route. In relation to the decision, we 
hope that both sides of the Strait may respec-
tively seek an ‘ambiguous Chinese lingual in-
terpretation’ to our people, especially those in 
Taiwan. (Lin, 2007)
September 6, the BOCOG once more empha-
sized the importance of obeying the former agree-
ment of the ‘four-point consensus’ and requested 
incorporation of it into the texts of the new mem-
oir. Based on the ‘consensus’, the BOCOG point-
ed out that CTOC is obliged to coordinate all con-
cerned parties to ensure any flags, emblems and 
songs which are inconsistent with IOC regulations 
would not be used during the torch relay. As Tai-
2 The new three points are:
1) The BOCOG promises to abide by a 1989 agreement between the CTOC and the Chinese Olympic Committee (COC), and 
will no longer refer to the CTOC and Taiwan’s athletic delegation as ‘China Taipei’ in Chinese moniker, but ‘Chinese Taipei’.
2) The BOCOG further confirms that Olympic Torch relay route through Taipei is an overseas route, not China’s domestic route.
3) The BOCOG will no longer use the term of ‘area’ in the expression of the overseas relay route, avoiding the implication of 
dwarfing Taiwan’s status. (Mainland Affairs Council, 2007)
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wan considered, Beijing sought to attach to the final 
agreement a clause saying when the Olympic torch 
passes through Taiwan, the national flag, emblem, 
anthem, or other symbol would not be displayed 
or played along the route, Taiwan found the de-
mand unacceptable and decided to terminate Chi-
na’s proposal (Interview A, 20 March 2009). Sub-
sequent attempts at negotiations, from both Taiwan 
and China, met with no degree of success. Though 
the IOC extended the deadline date for negotiations, 
to September 20, 2007, Taiwan was unable to be 
included on the route. The IOC e-mail, from Em-
manuelle Moreau, media-relations manager from 
the IOC, expressed regret over Taiwan’s non-inclu-
sion in the route:
 Our understanding is that a solution between 
the two has not been found to date, and that, 
with time to firm up logistics running out, the 
route will now have to go ahead without a stop 
in Chinese Taipei (…). The IOC would have 
liked to see the participation of people from 
Chinese Taipei, but acknowledge this will not be 
possible given the fact the two parties have not 
reached an agreement. (Taiwan News, 2007)
The dispute over the 2008 Beijing Olympic 
torch relay to passing through Taiwan, which had 
been turned into a partisan political struggle, was 
ended with the IOC’s announcement. This noted 
tale, which illustrates a network system of negoti-
ated order or governance, throws up a number of 
sets of participators in the emergent system. Within 
this context, the following sections seek to focus on 
the analysis of relationships between the relevant 
people in shaping policy outcomes.
Discussion and conclusions
The dynamics of the strategic context on 
the key participators
In recent decades, “rising national pride has lent 
strong support to the Chinese government and a 
deep sense of national identity plays, in fact, a cru-
cial role in shaping fundamental aspects of China’s 
rise and aspirations” (Carlson, 2007, p. 253). For 
the Chinese government, hosting the 2008 Beijing 
Olympic Games was intended to give political and 
national meaning for the country, particularly in 
relation to the recognition of a successful Commu-
nist leadership both in domestic and international 
arenas. With specific reference to China, the deli-
cate political situation concerning the 2008 Olym-
pic torch arose from the decades-old difference in 
standpoints between China and Taiwan regarding 
state sovereignty claims. For a long time, China has 
recognized Taiwan as its provincial state and thus 
has considered it as a ‘local’ stop in the mapping 
of the Olympic torch’s route, which included Tai-
wan in the same route of its special administrative 
regions, Hong Kong and Macau. Indeed,
 the ‘One China Principle’ of Chinese foreign 
policy allows no expression of the existence 
of the ROC [Taiwan] as a sovereign state (…). 
Thus any move toward independence by Taiwan 
could provoke a military reaction in Beijing that 
would disrupt the Olympic Games. Taiwan is 
more important than the Olympic Games be-
cause it is considered a question of national 
sovereignty. (Brownell, 2008, p. 187)
For China, “the Olympics is not one of [Chi-
na’s] three major tasks [which the Party leader-
ship describes as modernization, reunification, 
and common development]; reunification is” (Pe-
terson, 2004, p. 26). Politically, the PRC insists on 
the ‘One China Principle’ and avoids portraying an 
image of ‘two Chinas’ at a global level. The treat-
ment of Taiwan by the World Health Organization 
(WHO) during the 2003 SARS outbreak, when the 
WHO acceded to Beijing’s demand to secure Bei-
jing’s permission before going to Taipei, is but one 
example (Peterson, 2004, p. 25). As such, sport is 
subject to the same regulations stipulated under the 
‘One China Principle’, “a condition set by Beijing 
for further cooperation” (Chan, 2002, p. 141). The 
Chinese government takes a more pragmatic look 
at the ‘principle’, emphasizing the need to locate 
sport firmly within the single Chinese political en-
tity. For some decades, Chinese political authori-
ties or sporting governing bodies confirm a rule.
 Taiwan is a province of China. Taiwan sports 
organizations should be under the leadership 
of the Chinese Olympic Committee. Item 24 of 
the Olympic Charter rules that within one coun-
try, there is only one Olympic Committee that 
organizes activities according to the Olympic 
Charter and the Olympic Ideal. (Fan & Xiong, 
2002, p. 325)
In the process of negotiating with the torch re-
lay, China’s message was evidently clear that sport 
was to be regarded as an area of both domestic and 
international politics like any other. A comment by 
Brownell illustrates this point:
 China is not trying to show its ‘superiority’ 
through the torch relay. It is trying to symboli-
cally express that the government of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China is the sole legitimate 
government of all of China, and Taiwan is a 
dependent territory, which has been officially 
recognized by the UN, the IOC, and the nearly 
200 nations that have diplomatic relations with 
the PRC. (Thesbjerg, 2007, p. 2)
Thus restraints on Taiwan’s actions which may 
imply an alienation of China’s sovereignty were 
deemed to be reasonable. This example shows how 
sport as an important issue is subject to government 
control as are any other areas in a society. As a re-
sult of those failures, China shifted to a more nu-
anced Taiwan policy even though a minority had 
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celebrated such a possibility. China’s reliance on 
the IOC in its United Nations present form, which 
defines a one China policy in the conduct of the 
Chinese, has sought to ‘manage’ this network of 
relations principally in two ways. The first is, as 
previously noted, by international recognition (sov-
ereignty, diplomacy) or regulations where the na-
ture of political obligations allows China to steer to 
some extent the activities of international sport gov-
erning bodies (the IOC in this case). For instance, 
Jiang Xiaoyu, vice president of the BOCOG once 
pointed out that:
 With the help of the IOC guidelines, I’m sure we 
can work together to satisfy everybody’s goals. 
The torch relay schedule must be approved by 
the International Olympic Committee (IOC)’s 
executive board, which meets in Beijing (…). It 
had been ‘generally settled’ and would be an-
nounced by the end of April [2007]. (Interna-
tional World Games Association, 2007)
While the ‘One China Principle’ was utilized 
by the Beijing government, as a means of protect-
ing the Chinese cultural diversity of the regions and 
the nation states of China, it nonetheless constrains 
its position to negotiate with the pro-independence 
DPP regime.
The second is by ‘incorporation’ of potential in-
terest groups (e.g. KMT-affiliated politicians, busi-
ness elites, and athletes, etc.), which might not chal-
lenge its authority, into ‘membership of the Chinese 
Community’ in the Olympic atmosphere. Admit-
tedly, China’s political intention for the torch relay 
left room for promoting national identity and sov-
ereignty of a one China, and it also offered greater 
attention to providing business opportunities to the 
Taiwanese. China is a significant influence since an 
independent Taiwan versus Taiwan as an element 
in a greater China provides the major political and/
or economic cleavage between the different parties. 
The prospect of hosting the first successful Chinese 
Olympic Games (torch relay included) generated 
a degree of incentives among some in Taiwanese 
political and business elites. The various groups/
actors in Taiwan who made their positions appar-
ent, and those who did not, inevitably rehearsed 
their arguments in anticipation of the Chinese Ol-
ympic glory, together with considering commer-
cial interests. Such an attempt to generate a more 
economically responsive commercial approach by 
the Chinese government, however, met limited suc-
cess. That is because the DPP regime successfully 
provoked the ‘consciousness’ amongst the general 
public of a ‘Taiwanese nation’ which is considered 
far more important than economic interest while 
dealing with the torch issue (Interview D, 13 March 
2009). Surrounding such ‘sociopolitical’ circum-
stances, the strategies (actions), which individuals 
or groups adopt, will yield effects; some of these 
maybe intended, but there are also likely to be un-
intended consequences (McAnulla, 2002).
The profound shifts in Taiwan’s internal po-
litical, economic and social structures have had a 
significant impact on its place in the global politi-
cal system (Lin, et al., 2010). During the KMT’s 
ruling period, both China and Taiwan sought to 
claim legitimacy in representing the ‘interests of 
China’, nevertheless, as the DPP gained power in 
2000, the political change has provided impetus for 
abandoning the KMT’s core commitment to Chi-
nese nationalism and facilitated ideological accom-
modation, with opposition on the issue of national 
identity (Lin, et al., 2010). The building of an inde-
pendent Taiwan implies a different policy mind-set 
from that of viewing Taiwan as an integral element 
of a Chinese nation-state, implying some form of 
political sovereignty in the longer term. Domes-
tic politics and domestic sporting politics are thus 
intimately affected by some differences between 
the KMT and DPP (Liu, 2003, pp. 234-235). Cou-
pled with the promotion of some key political goals 
such as the establishment of a sovereign and an 
independent state by the DPP government, there 
is the recognition of how a growing sense of Tai-
wan’s sovereignty and national identity is changing 
and shaping public attitudes. The ‘consciousness’ 
amongst the general public of a ‘Taiwanese nation’, 
supported by the DPP, began to grow and became 
stronger than the ‘consciousness’ of the ‘ROC na-
tion’ promoted by the KMT. The ideology of what 
constituted ‘Taiwan nationalism’ began to signifi-
cantly challenge the KMT’s hegemony which, in 
turn, has had a profound impact on sport develop-
ment. In the case of the torch issue, sport was thus 
utilized as an important facet of claims to nation-
hood, which intensified with the ongoing troubled 
relationship with China.
Girginov (2009, p. 517) argues that “the form 
of the ‘state’ and its basic structural mechanisms 
preconditioned the state as the site, the generator 
and the product of strategies”. Although the 
Olympic movement is a global phenomenon, it has, 
nevertheless, operated within a specific regional 
environment in the Chinese context and became a 
battlefield for the enactment of contestation between 
the two different political entities. With regard to 
the strategic relations at play in the case study, the 
Olympic movement, on the one hand, has enabled 
both countries to participate in international sports 
under the so-called ‘Olympic Formula’ (Chan, 
2002, p. 41). Under the ‘Olympic Formula’, Taiwan’s 
government has focused on the aim of attending 
international sports events to enhance the image of 
the Taiwan/ROC. Thus a reflexive and formulative 
strategy, on the basis of partial knowledge of the 
structures, makes it possible for the participators to 
formulate strategies, which overcome the problems 
created for them by strategically selective contexts 
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(McAnulla, 2002). Taiwan’s strategy of rejecting 
China’s proposal, because it violated the 1989 
formal agreement [Olympic Formula] that ensures 
the Taiwan/Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee, 
as a member of the IOC, shares the rights and 
obligations to participate in the IOC international 
sporting activities on equal terms with other 
members (Interview B, 17 March 2009).
The position of Taiwan is as clear as that of 
China. Taiwan tends to give greater emphasis to 
the principle of political sovereignty, Olympic con-
ventions, and parity/reciprocity of cross-strait re-
lations (Bairner & Hwang, 2011). However, these 
principles contrast with the approach of China, in 
particular with the issue of sovereignty. Interest-
ingly, the ‘Olympic Formula’, to some extent, has 
constrained China’s actions/interest since Taiwan’s 
political will/interest was able to appeal to inter-
national regulations and thereby legitimate their 
claims as well as drawing on the strength of the 
global sporting body [the IOC], which lay beyond 
China-Taiwan’s own sporting and political constitu-
ency. In this case, the effects of strategies can never 
wholly be predicted. Outcomes are contingent and 
they do ultimately tend to favor those participators’ 
interests that are able to exert an influence given the 
structural advantages which are the product of past 
history (Girginov, 2009; Henry, 2001; Liu, 2003, 
2005). As Hay has pointed out that,
 The ability of agents to change structural cir-
cumstances through an active process of stra-
tegic learning: agents are reflexive, capable of 
reformulating, within limits, their own identi-
ties and interests, and able to engage in stra-
tegic calculation about their current situation. 
(Hay, 1996, p. 124)
Regional China-Taiwan sports politics are thus 
implicated within a global sports system, which pro-
vides a source of influence and power.
While the cases of China and Taiwan, repre-
senting the structure of sport, the interrelations of 
forces, and the role of individual agents, are con-
sidered as equally important for a comprehensive 
inquiry over a specific time horizon and in a spe-
cific context, the IOC represents a social relation 
that can be seen as the site, the generator and the 
product of strategies which has only relatively em-
braced ‘neutrality’ in sports politics. Interestingly, 
the IOC, although its principles were allegedly apo-
litical, plunged right into the heart of politics. To a 
certain degree, the IOC was concerned with its own 
‘interests’, largely avoiding controversy, and placed 
a premium on developing a stable relationship with 
China because of China’s politics and economy, and 
because it/China plays a key role in steering or even 
controlling an international agenda (Liu, 2007). On 
the other hand, the IOC represents an interesting at-
tempt of rooting for sport in a peaceful culture and 
human healthy activity other than that of politics 
and exploitative economics. In the case of the torch 
relay, it could not be regarded simply as a matter for 
a sporting arena, but also of political and economic 
interests. The political sporting ‘state’ is a terrain 
where IOC, China, and Taiwan are seen as a bat-
tle field. The state itself is a site of rivalries among 
its different branches where political participants 
struggle with one another to secure access to state 
resources (Henry, 2001). Sport (through individual 
agents) should be seen both as a force acting within 
the state and also as an ensemble of powers which 
act within sport and between sport and the state. As 
a force in itself, sport is subjected to the structures 
of power within the state and accordingly it may 
be regarded as a force struggling to secure access 
to the state resources for the realization of specific 
sports projects (Girginov, 2009). Thus the stances 
(e.g. international regulations in this case) being 
adopted are of importance as they canvass ‘for’ and 
‘against’ the legal competence of the IOC, seeking 
to support their own positions.
Actually, the IOC, “in its Olympic Charter, 
states any of the celebrations or ceremonies held 
in relation to the Olympic flame and/or lighting of 
the Olympic torch must be approved by the IOC” 
(Cahill, 1998, p. 181). This is what China stresses, 
in its desire to protect and advance the interests of 
political participators, sports bodies and adminis-
trators, etc., it has helped galvanize the support of 
the Chinese government, the China Olympic Com-
mittee, and the BOCOG, behind the ‘pro’ inclusion 
of the Taiwan lobby. The torch relay, as the IOC em-
phasizes, which is supposed to embody the Olym-
pic values of friendship through sports, is a popu-
lar public relations tool and the only contact most 
people have with the Olympics (Bowan, 2007). The 
IOC might have had its own reasons for compro-
mising the situation, by acknowledging two com-
mittees in order to react to all of the political issues 
that now seem to surround Beijing 2008. The IOC 
claimed that:
 Whilst it is not the right of the IOC to direct-
ly influence relationships between sovereign 
powers, we believe that the Olympic Values of 
respect and friendship will set a positive inde-
pendent example at the Games. The IOC does 
not take a role in influencing the behavior of 
the Chinese government either internally or on 
its position on the world stage. (International 
Olympic Committee, 2007, p. 4)
It further reflects its attitude toward the contro-
versial torch relay issue between China and Taiwan.
 The differences of opinion between China and 
Taiwan are specifically related to Taiwanese 
issues of independence. The IOC has no ap-
propriate role in determining a solution to this 
disagreement. It is a matter for BOCOG to re-
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solve as the organizing committee for Beijing 
2008. (International Olympic Committee, 2007, 
p. 43)
Of significant importance, in light of the world’s 
highest arbitrative sporting governing body, the 
question becomes: to what extent must the IOC 
obey its own position? Not surprisingly, the IOC’s 
members are primarily interested in maintaining 
their rule through inducement of moral persuasion 
rather than through direct action and control. The 
role of the IOC is in part related to seeing that 
‘Olympic values’ are not ‘subverted’ by political 
intervention, while also ensuring that the two 
national Olympic Committees’ goals are pursued 
in the sport field. The IOC seems likely to take 
a more pragmatic look at the torch relay agenda, 
emphasizing the need to locate sport within the 
Olympic movement. There is a general consensus 
among members of the IOC that there is a need 
for the IOC to be more neutral, comprising and 
coordinative, to support Olympic development for a 
long-term sustainable growth and to make the IOC 
project more tangible and equitable to IOC members. 
The notion of steering (rather than commending) is 
thus a key word in the IOC’s agenda in relation to 
dealing with the torch relay case.
Concluding remarks
What the study reported in this paper has 
sought to show is that the governance system in 
the political-sporting domain in the ‘Chinese 
Community’ is perhaps best understood through 
the prism of a strategic relations approach. In 
essence, a form of strategic relations theory is re-
quired to characterize the contingent outcomes of 
battles between contending groups of participators, 
highlighting the structural context within which 
they operate, and the way in which such contexts act 
as resources and constraints for the shaping of such 
a political-sport nexus. With regard to the strategic 
relations at play in the case study, the 2008 Olympic 
Games torch relay route exemplifies local Chinese-
Taiwanese sports politics being implicated within a 
global political-sporting system, which provides a 
source of influence and power. Our understanding 
of strategic context is crucial if we are to understand 
the opportunities and constraints which exist for 
any participator in the system. Past and present 
struggles and their outcomes create various socio-
political environments that presuppose the forms 
of state intervention in sport. The nature of the 
relationships between the participators and the 
tactics adopted underline the claim that the nature 
of the system of governance which has developed 
in sport in the China-Taiwan context has politically 
specific characteristics. The development of a sports 
policy over the last six decades inside/beyond the 
‘Chinese Community’ has been linked to wider 
power struggles (e.g. the Olympic Movement) and 
this has presented the participators with resources 
for, and constraints on, any actions taken. Both of 
the key actors in Taiwan (ROC) and China (PRC) 
have taken advantage of structure, in terms of global 
regulations, to promote their interests. The ‘state’ 
has been seen as the outcome of past struggles 
between the actors which also forms the context 
of, and resources for, contemporary struggles. The 
outcomes of these past struggles will invariably 
reflect the interests of the powerful groups. The 
history of local struggles and outcomes of state 
activity are contingent, not determined.
Modern states are more likely to pursue their 
projects by engaging in a complex network of com-
petition and collaboration. In such a context, the 
torch relay issue is thus characterized by a diversity 
of interests, preferences, values and, ideas, which 
the individuals or groups seek to promote or pro-
tect. The case study illustrates how the participators 
behaved in order to achieve strategic goals. In this 
case, political factors, such as nation sovereignty 
and national identity, have shaped the thrust and 
pace of the developmental strategies in the specific 
‘Chinese Community’ context. To some extent, Tai-
wan’s ‘interests’ were defended by the state’s politi-
cal motivations (national sovereignty and identity), 
which contributed to shaping the goals and strate-
gies of the development. Intervention conducted by 
the Chinese government, in contrast, provided an 
example of that regime exerting influence upon the 
nature of this issue, as well as its governing bod-
ies (COC and BOCOG). The negotiating processes 
with the torch relay route conducted/directed by the 
Chinese Government or governing bodies sought to 
steer the sports system to achieve desired outcomes 
by moral pressure (both on Taiwan’s Government 
and citizens, by promises of sharing Chinese culture 
and honor), use of economic or other incentives (to 
Taiwan’s political parties and citizens), and regula-
tions (one-China policy) to influence other parties 
to act in ways consistent with the desired outcomes. 
The IOC stood in a neutral position of China’s pro-
posal for the route, the dispute over the issue, which 
had been turned into a partisan political struggle, 
was ended with Taiwan’s decision/rejection. The 
IOC, though incorporating the most powerful set 
of participators within the international sporting 
system, with access to financial resources, person-
nel, information, and so on, sought to steer rather 
than demand its preferred outcome. The two sides 
of the Taiwan Strait sought to utilize strategic re-
sources to affect outcomes and protect their inter-
ests in the decision-making process. The situation 
underlined the fact that there was no single body, 
which was the sole author of sport’s own destiny. 
This has a major implication that governing bodies 
in such contexts no longer govern, or wholly con-
trol, their sport, or at least if they do, they do by 
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U ovom je članku upotrijebljen pristup formi-
ran iz koncepta strategijskih odnosa u empirijskom 
vrednovanju ponašanja sudionika u upravljanju po-
litičkim sportskim sustavom unutar/iza “kineske za-
jednice”. Članak naglašava važnost političkih na-
mjera kao ključne karakteristike strategijskoga okru-
ženja koje je stvorilo prostor za provedbu interesnih 
“političkih akcija” dviju vlada te vrednuje reakcije 
sudionika u sustavu upravljanja problemom. Izve-
dena su tri glavna zaključka: prvi, ovaj slučaj po-
kazuje kako je lokalni kinesko-tajvansko sportsko-
politički splet kompleksnih veza bio uvučen u glo-
balni sportski sustav kao strategijski kontekst koji 
osigurava izvor utjecaja i moći te ograničava i/ili 
olakšava odabir rješenja koja su na raspolaganju 
TO NIJE SAMO SPORT: TAIWAN I PUT OLIMPIJSKE 
BAKLJE ZA OLIMPIJSKE IGRE U PEKINGU 2008. GODINE
sudionicima; drugi, ističe kako se političke namjere 
modernih zemalja, tj. njihovi projekti, sve više rea-
liziraju uključivanjem u kompleksne mreže konku-
rencije/natjecanja ili suradnje, stoga je pitanje rute 
olimpijske baklje obilježeno raznovrsnim interesi-
ma, preferencijama, vrijednostima i idejama poje-
dinih grupa i pojedinaca koje oni žele promovirati ili 
zaštititi u takvom kontekstu; i na kraju, ovaj slučaj 
oslikava kako ishod čitavoga niza sukoba (pitanje 
rute olimpijske baklje) postavlja strategijski kontekst 
za iduće upravljačke odluke. 
Ključne riječi: sudionik, uprava, pristup stra-
tegijskih odnosa         
